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MOSCOW ACCORD CRYSTALLIZES POLICY OF GREAT POWERS

WITHIN less than a week after publication of the Moscow accord on November 1, the Senate's adoption of the revised Connally resolution by a vote of 85 to 5, and Stalin's jubilant speech on the eve of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution have already carried forward the work accomplished by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Russia and the United States. The five documents drawn up in Moscow justify the most sanguine expectations by mapping the general outlines of the post-war settlement the three powers have agreed to support, and by establishing machinery in the form of the European Advisory Commission, with headquarters in London, for the discussion of specific issues—many of them as yet unpredictable—that may arise during and after the war.

Although the main surprise of the Moscow conference was China's participation in the signing of the Four-Nation Declaration—a development that may presage a new era in the Pacific sector of the global war—the conferees touched widely and boldly on the whole range of Europe's problems. A thorough discussion of the military complexities of opening a front in Western Europe apparently resulted in giving satisfaction to Stalin, who on November 6 said that "the opening of the real second front in Europe . . . is not far off."

But, essential as a military understanding between the three great powers is to the speedy winning of the war, the political understandings they reached may, in the long run, prove even more important. Among the political highlights were (1) agreement on policy toward Germany; (2) formulation of a common policy toward liberated countries; (3) determination to establish a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security "at the earliest practicable date" and, meanwhile, to consult with one another and, as occasion requires, with other members of the United

Nations "with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations"; and (4) the decision to work for "a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period."

COMMON POLICY TOWARD GERMANY.

Any doubt that may have lingered in the minds of some people that Russia might consider a separate peace with a non-Nazi régime following liberation of its own territory is removed by the Four-Nation Declaration in which Britain, Russia, China and the United States affirm that they will "continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender"—the phrase first used by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at the Casablanca Conference. The four powers, moreover, declare "that those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy"—thus blasting the hopes of the Nazis that they might achieve a stalemate by driving a wedge between the United Nations. The Declaration on Austria is obviously intended to detach satellite countries from Germany, and to light the fuse of revolt in Germany by encouraging an uprising among the Austrians.

Moreover, in a separate statement on Nazi atrocities, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin put an end to speculation that one or other of the great powers would favor a "soft" peace for Germany. "At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany," German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who ordered or condoned acts of atrocity are to be sent back to the countries in which their acts were committed "in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free govern-

ments which will be erected therein." Those "who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood" are warned that they will suffer a like fate if they join "the ranks of the guilty."

POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED COUNTRIES.

The major misunderstandings that threatened to develop between the three great powers in their attitude toward liberated countries, and had already arisen over Anglo-American policy in North Africa and Italy, were frankly faced in the Declaration on Italy. Britain, Russia and the United States declare that they are "in complete agreement that Allied policy toward Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed, and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles." To dispel doubts about the past, Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden declare that the action of their governments in Italy "in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy."

In the future, the three powers agree that, subject to military necessities, the base of the Italian government should be broadened by the inclusion of representatives of anti-Fascist groups; all institutions and organizations created by the Fascist régime shall be suppressed; all Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from public institutions; democratic organs of local government shall be created; and "freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meetings shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people." It is interesting to note that, while all these freedoms are enjoyed in Britain and the United States, they are not (with the exception of freedom of religious worship now restored to members of the Greek Orthodox Church) as yet available to the people of Russia. Whether Russia's active participation in the restoration of freedom to peoples outside its borders liberated from Nazi and Fascist rule will have repercussions on its own political institutions opens up an interesting field for speculation.

TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. From the point of view of the United States the most interesting point of the Moscow accord is

Point 4 of the Four-Nation Declaration in which the four powers recognize "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." This statement, which reflects both the views and the language of Mr. Hull, was promptly incorporated into the Connally resolution adopted by the Senate on November 5. To the extent that such an organization does become effective after the war, it may prove feasible to fulfill the undertaking of Point 7 of the same declaration—"to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period." Such an agreement would fulfill the expressed desire of the four powers "of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments."

As was to have been expected, no specific statement was made about contested territories such as eastern Poland and the Baltic states, or about the fate of Finland. It cannot be assumed that this problem is covered by Point 6 of the Four-Nation Declaration, in which the signatories state that "after the termination of hostilities" they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation." At the time when hostilities are over the Russians may already be occupying the contested areas, and may also claim that they are part of the U.S.S.R.—not "the territories of other states." Such questions remain to be discussed by the European Advisory Commission.

The main point is that the Moscow Conference has created a working relationship between Britain, the United States and Russia; has recognized the equality of Russia and China with their two Western partners; has stressed the fact that a four-power accord must be not an end in itself but a stepping-stone to international organization; and has assured the small nations that in such an organization they will have a place with the great powers.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

MOSCOW ACCORD BRIGHTENS PROSPECTS IN FAR EAST

Although the Moscow agreements deal principally with European or world questions, their implications for the Far East are both specific and significant. This is understandable, since any far-reaching international accord serves to clarify the problems of areas with which it is not directly concerned—but it is important that the point should be stressed. An extended analysis would be required to develop adequately the possible repercussions in Eastern Asia,

but their essential nature is indicated in the following summary:

1. *Shortening the War Against Japan.*

If, as various straws in the wind suggest, military action against Germany is to be stepped up, this will also hasten the day of decisive blows against Japan; for the sooner Germany is beaten, the more quickly will it be possible for Britain and the United States to face Tokyo in full

strength. Moreover, the ability of the Moscow conferees to agree on leading political and military questions points to the frustration of Japan's hopes for a negotiated peace as a result of possible disunity among the United Nations. The Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, K. C. Wu, was quite right when he stated on November 2 that the agreements must "put the Japanese in a fearful mood."

2. *Recognizing the Equality of China.*

The Joint Four-Nation Declaration constitutes the first official recognition of China's position as one of the "Big Four" of the United Nations. It is noteworthy that this recognition takes the form not of rhetoric, but of simple acceptance of the fact that China must be one of the major powers responsible for future world organization. This is a political blow of great severity to Japan—especially since it should destroy any hopes Tokyo may have had for a "negotiated peace" with Chungking. It also cuts the ground from under the argument sometimes advanced that the Russians and the British "do not have the same attitude toward Chungking" as we do.

3. *Indicating Soviet Attitude Toward Japan.*

Although the Joint Four-Nation Declaration is so worded as not to commit the U.S.S.R. to measures against Japan, it actually makes no distinction between Germany and Japan. The pact is, in effect, a declaration of unity of all four major powers against the entire Axis, both in Europe and Asia. It suggests that Soviet "neutrality" toward Japan has been based largely on the necessity of not being diverted from the primary task of smashing the Nazis, that after the defeat of Germany the Russians may play a larger role in the Far Eastern war picture (although perhaps still avoiding outright military action), and that

they are expected to be influential in any Far Eastern settlement. This is not only important in a military sense, but it weakens one of the few arguments remaining to the opponents of international cooperation in this country—namely, that "the Russians are not fighting the Japanese."*

4. *Facilitating Far Eastern Reconstruction.*

Although Europe's problems differ in many respects from those of Asia—a large part of which is colonial territory—the Moscow agreements on war criminals and the future of Austria and Italy may contain useful suggestions for Far Eastern reorganization. Moreover, the fact that there is now a greater prospect of orderly post-war development in Europe means that the likelihood of fairly orderly Far Eastern reconstruction has also increased, since avoidance of chaotic conditions in the West is a prerequisite for the satisfactory future growth of Asia.

All these possibilities indicate that the results achieved at Moscow constitute an important contribution to the winning of the Far Eastern war and the establishment of a satisfactory peace in Asia as well as in Europe. Undoubtedly many questions still remain to be dealt with—for example, the whole colonial problem—but what has already been accomplished will facilitate future consideration of these knotty points.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

*For fuller discussion of this question, see "Grant of Siberian Bases Might Mean Their Loss to Japan," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, November 5, 1943.

Under Cover, by J. R. Carlson. New York, Dutton, 1943. \$3.50

Sensational story of a one-man investigation of American anti-democratic movements.

Documents on International Affairs, 1938, Vol. 2, edited by Monica Curtis. New York, Oxford University Press, 1943. \$7.50

This continuation of an invaluable series brings together the principal documents on German foreign policy in the year of Austria's annexation and the Munich agreement.

NBC Handbook of Pronunciation, compiled by James F. Bender. New York, Crowell, 1943. \$2.75

With the present barrage of material on basic English, this "three-way" treatment of how to pronounce more than 12,000 words according to accepted American standards is apropos.

Resistance and Reconstruction, by Chiang Kai-shek. New York, Harper, 1943. \$3.50

A valuable collection of messages and statements of the Generalissimo during six years of war.

What are the post-war objectives of the occupied nations of Europe? For a survey of the underground movements and documents of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia —READ:

POST-WAR PROGRAMS OF EUROPE'S UNDERGROUND

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
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Washington News Letter



Nov. 8.—General Francisco Franco's message of congratulations last week to José P. Laurel, Japanese-installed President of the Philippines, was the most spectacular in a long series of indignities that the United States—which is providing sanctuary for the Philippine government-in-exile—has suffered from the government of Spain. Spanish newspapers, over which the government in Madrid exercises strict control, have published scurrilous and critical references to the United States. At meetings sponsored by the *Falange Española Tradicionalista*, the United States and the Allied cause have been scoffed at. The Falange, chief political force behind the government, has attempted to undermine our influence in Latin America, although with decreasing success and flagging energy. Spain has given token military support to the German fight against our ally Russia, where from July 1941 until this fall Spanish volunteers organized in the Blue Legion helped man the front around Lake Ilmen.

UNITED STATES MAY ACT. Acting Secretary of State Stettinius told his press conference on November 4 that the American government is giving serious consideration to Franco's message to Laurel, and that perhaps a little later it will be possible to say something on the matter. This restrained comment is the closest approach to criticism of the Spanish government which has come from Washington.

The United States has not only swallowed humiliations from Spain but has gone out of its way to conciliate the authoritarian and anti-democratic Spanish government. On August 28, 1942 President Roosevelt proposed that the American Republics assist in the restoration of art treasures injured during the Spanish Civil War and that tourism be encouraged from the New World to Spain. On February 26, 1943 American Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes, speaking in Barcelona, praised the Spanish government for "doing so much with such obvious success to develop a peace economy" and assured Spaniards that "the United States stands ready to continue and extend any help it can give to Spain." In September Britain's Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden publicly criticized the use of the Blue Legion in Russia, but Secretary of State Cordell Hull, when asked to comment on September 22, said only that the United States has been keeping the Spanish government acquainted with our interest in this matter. On his return from Moscow, Secretary Hull may reveal whether he feels that the time is ripe to strike

a firm note in public respecting Spain.

CONCESSIONS FROM SPAIN. The Roosevelt Administration justifies its Spanish policy on the ground that it has accomplished its aim—to keep Spain neutral. In its opinion, the Franco government had to be bribed, and the bribery is regarded as having made possible the African landings of a year ago and the subsequent successful development of the war in Africa and Italy. Spokesmen in Washington cite four concessions gained through appeasing Spain:

1. Ambassador Hayes won Franco's agreement to dismiss Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer, a Falange extremist whose policy seemed to be leading toward active collaboration with the Axis in the war.
2. The United States has been able to buy Spanish wolfram while Germany, lacking the needed exchange, has tried in vain to procure this strategic material from Spain.
3. The Spanish government has agreed not to intern American and Allied airmen forced down on Spanish territory.
4. The French Committee of National Liberation, as a result of United States intervention, has been permitted to send a diplomatic delegation to Madrid.

The makers of this policy contend that Spain has been won cheaply. The United States has sold petroleum, sulphate of ammonia, cotton, peas, beans, coal, cellulose, carbon black, codfish and industrial chemicals to Spain, but the value of strategic material imports exceeds the value of these exports and Spain has a dollar balance here. Opponents of the policy hold that any price to Franco is excessive and some insist that Spain, unrecovered from its civil war, would have remained neutral without appeasement.

When the United States recognized Franco on April 1, 1939 it did not foresee the grip which the Falange would secure on him, but the Roosevelt Administration is now satisfied that Franco cannot last beyond the war and would not be saddened by his fall. Both the United States and Great Britain are thinking of Spain's future, and apparently desire to have neither the Falange nor the Left seize power when Franco is shoved aside. Washington and London seem to lean toward restoration of the monarchy, with Prince Juan, third son of the late King Alfonso, on the throne, in the hope that he will heal the wounds of the civil war and at the same time be sympathetic to British and American interests.

BLAIR BOLLES

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